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Institute of Computer Science, University of Silesia, Sosnowiec, POLAND
ABSTRACT. In the era of global informatization, transmitting and storing in-
formation in digital form it is very important to ensure an adequate level of secu-
rity of ciphers used. Cryptanalysis deals with studying the level of security, thus
exposing the weakness of theoretical and implemented cryptographic solutions.
In this paper cryptanalysis of stream cipher VMPC using Tabu Search is shown.
From estimates made on a full version of VMPC cipher we concluded that about
2157 possibilities needs to be checked in order to find the proper one, which would
be the best attack known so far.
1. Introduction
Every day people communicate with each other. To secure this communication
in computer systems a cryptography is widely used. A cryptography is such
a transformation of a plaintext message that it becomes unreadable for a third
party without a secret key.
Modern cryptography systems can be divided into two branches depending on
what unit they transform. If a larger block (e.g., 64-128 bits) is transformed as
a whole, this is a block cipher. If a small unit (e.g., 1 bit or 1 byte) is transformed
separately one by one, this is a stream cipher. In this paper, a stream cipher
called VMPC will be discussed.
In order to make a cryptanalysis of VMPC cipher, we propose a modification
of Tabu Search (TS) metaheuristic algorithm [4] and we called it tabu cryptanal-
ysis. Metaheuristics were used so far for cryptanalysis, but mainly for classical
and modern block ciphers. E.g., cryptanalysis of substitution cipher with Ge-
netic Algorithm [1]; cryptanalysis of Vigene`re cipher with Genetic Algorithm,
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Particle Swarm Optimization and Cuckoo Search [2]; cryptanalysis of DES re-
duced to four and six rounds with Particle Swarm Optimization and Differential
Evolution [6]; cryptanalysis of DES reduced to six rounds with Genetic Algo-
rithm and Simulated Annealing [3]. The cryptanalysis of stream ciphers with
metaheuristic algorithms has not been tested so well.
Tabu Search was introduced in 1986 by F. G l o v e r [4]. It is an iterated
algorithm. In every iteration a neighbourhood of the current solution is checked.
A neighbourhood is formed by a predefined move. Solutions from the neigh-
bourhood are evaluated with some fitness function and the best one is chosen as
a current solution for the next iteration. The important part of a Tabu Search is
tabu list. It is a list of moves done recently. At the same time, these are forbidden
moves. The number of iterations in which a move is forbidden is called horizon.
The purpose of tabu list is to escape from local optima and go to a new area of
potential solutions.
The attack, presented in this work, is a state recovery attack. That means
that our aim is to find the internal state of the cipher right after key scheduling
algorithm and before pseudo-random generation phase. This would be equivalent
to revealing the key. The attack requires |S| bytes of keystream, where |S| is the
size of permutation array in bytes. In [9] the same kind of attack was presented for
the VMPC cipher. However, further research led to conclusion that parameters
used then could be insufficient in order to find internal state of the cipher. In
current research four types of fitness function, four types of neighbourhood, six
types of horizon and two types of aspiration criteria were used. Experiments on
the reduced version of VMPC cipher showed that a neighbourhood type used in
research presented in [9] is ineffective.
Research carried out on reduced to 10 and 16 bytes versions of VMPC cipher
showed implicitly that tabu cryptanalysis is possible. They were also a basis to
select the values of parameters for tabu cryptanalysis of the full version of VMPC
cipher.
In the following Subsection 1.1 the notation used in our work is introduced.
In Section 2 the VMPC cipher is described. The attacks known so far are also
presented there. Section 3 contains the description of tabu cryptanalysis and
considered values of parameters. In Section 4 the experiments and their results
are presented. Section 5 concludes the work.
1.1. Notation
In this paper we use the following notation:
• avg – arithmetic mean,
• B – compatibility function,
• ffit – fitness function,
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• i, j – 8-bit integer indices,
• κ – keystream,
• κ′ – keystream from the current solution,
• K – key,
• l – iteration number,
• max – maximum value,
• min – minimum value,
• P – plaintext (in bytes),
• r – current solution (permutation),
• R(r) – neighbourhood of the current solution,
• R2 – coefficient of determination,
• rBest – the best permutation found in the whole algorithm run,
• S – a byte array containing the permutation of natural numbers {0, 1, . . . ,
S − 1},
• s – standard deviation,
• TABU – tabu list,
• ⊕ – exclusive or (XOR),
• + – addition mod 256,
• | · | – cardinality of a set or the length of stream in bytes (depending on
context).
The abbreviated permutation (a0, a1, a2, a3, . . . , a|S|−1) will mean the map-
ping of 0 in a0, element 1 in a1 and so on:(
a0, a1, a2, a3, . . . , a|S|−1
)
=
(
0 1 2 3 . . . |S| − 1
a0 a1 a2 a3 . . . a|S|−1
)
. (1)
2. VMPC
Stream cipher VMPC is Polish cipher introduced in 2004 by B. Z˙ o´ l t a k [13].
Its author claims that it is used by Polish firms, institutions and individuals. Al-
though, in our opinion, security of VMPC cipher has not been verified sufficiently.
VMPC cipher consists of a 256-byte array S, which contains a permutation of
integer numbers from 0 to 255, and two 8-bit variables i and j. In every clock
this cipher produces one byte of a keystream by function:
g(x) = VMPC
(
f(x)
)
= f
(
f
(
f(x)
)
+ 1
)
mod 256. (2)
Internal state of VMPC cipher changes with every clock, because of a 2-element
swap.
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The key K in the VMPC cipher is not used directly, which is common in
stream ciphers. The secret key and public initialization vector (IV) are the input
for the key scheduling algorithm (KSA). In this phase they are being diffused in
the internal state of the VMPC cipher. After this phase is completed, the pseudo-
random generation algorithm (PRGA) follows. This is the phase that generates
the keystream κ for encryption. In the PRGA phase the key is not used any
more. The PRGA phase of the VMPC is shown in Algorithm 1. The KSA phase
is not included in the article as it is irrelevant for presented research.
Algorithm 1: The PRGA phase of the VMPC cipher.
1 i ← 0
2 for k ← 1 to |P | do
3 j ← S[ j + S[i] ]
4 output ← S[S[S[j]]+1]
5 swap (S[i], S[j])
6 i ← i + 1
Keystream κ byte by byte is added to subsequent bytes of plaintext stream P
using exclusive or function (XOR). This way a ciphertext stream C is obtained:
Pm ⊕ κm = Cm, (3)
where:
Pm: m-th byte of plaintext,
κm: m-th byte of keystream,
Cm: m-th byte of ciphertext.
2.1. Known attacks
The author of VMPC cipher claims that inverting the base function requires
an estimated average of 2260 computational operations [13]. In literature, a few
distinguishing attacks can be found [7,8,11,12]. The best of them was proposed
by S. S a r k a r [11] and requires 224 bytes of a keystream. Although the existence
of distinguishing attacks is considered as security threat for a stream cipher,
the distinguishing attack does not reveal directly any information about the
key or the plaintext. This kind of attack only finds statistical deviations from
truly random stream in order to distinguish if the generated stream is random
or produced by VMPC cipher. Therefore, it seems that the security of VMPC
cipher needs to be better investigated.
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3. Tabu cryptanalysis
Cryptanalytic attack presented in the paper is based on metaheuristic tech-
nique called Tabu Search (TS) [4]. TS was derived from how people solve tasks:
they avoid repeating recently made moves and search new types of solutions
somewhere else. We have adopted the technique to cryptanalysis and we named
our approach a tabu cryptanalysis (Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2: Tabu cryptanalysis.
1 r ← random permutation
2 rBest ← r
3 TABU ← {}
4 l ← 0
5 while termination criterion not satisfied do
6 R(r) ← {permutations arising from possible 2-element swap on r}
7 r = arg max
n∈R(r)
(ffit(n))
8 if ffit(r) > ffit(rBest) then
9 rBest ← r
10 update TABU
11 l ← l + 1
12 return rBest
At the start we pick some random solution (random permutation). Next we de-
fine a neighbouring permutation as a permutation that has two elements swapped
with each other. Every permutation is rated by fitness function ffit. From those
neighbouring permutations the best one is chosen as current solution. But at the
same time this swap is put on tabu list. This will prevent from using the same
swap in some nearest iterations. The number of iterations in which a recently
done move is forbidden is called horizon and can be parameterized. At the end,
the best solution found during the whole run is returned.
The termination criterion (Algorithm 2, line 5) can be different, e.g., a pre-
defined number of iterations, fixed amount of time, reaching predefined value of
fitness function or no improvement during fixed number of subsequent iterations.
Termination criterion in Section 4 is defined separately for every experiment and
it is included in the conditions of the experiment.
The rBest is updated as global best solution found so far. Current and next
solution are not compared with each other. The current solution r is changed
in every iteration as the best from the legitimate neighbourhood (Algorithm 2,
line 7).
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3.1. Fitness function
In all types of fitness function compatibility function of two bytes was used.
This compatibility function was defined as follows:
B(κ′m, κm) =
{
0, κ′m = κm,
1, κ′m = κm.
(4)
Four types of fitness function were tested:
a) byte fitness:
ffit(κ
′) =
∑|κ|
m=1B(κ
′
m, κm)
|κ| · 100%, (5)
b) adjacent byte fitness:
ffit(κ
′) =
2 ·∑|κ|m=1B(κ′m, κm) +∑|κ|−1m=1 B(κ′m+1, κm) +∑|κ|m=2B(κ′m−1, κm)
2 · |κ| · 100%,
(6)c) weighted fitness:
ffit(κ
′) =
∑|κ|
m=1(|κ| −m+ 1) · B(κ′m, κm)
|κ|+1
2 · |κ|
· 100%, (7)
d) weighted reversely fitness:
ffit(κ
′) =
∑|κ|
m=1m ·B(κ′m, κm)
|κ|+1
2 · |κ|
· 100%. (8)
3.2. Neighbourhood
In the problem presented in the article, an acceptable solution is any permu-
tation of natural numbers from 0 to a given range, depending on the size of the
analysed cipher (|S|). For the VMPC cipher, this permutation will determine the
internal state at the beginning of communication, i.e., right after the end of the
KSA phase, and before starting the PRGA phase.
The solution from the permutation neighbourhood is also a permutation,
almost identical to that considered. Permutations differ from each other by
any two elements that swapped their places. Having the given permutation:
(a0, a1, . . . , ax, . . . , ay, . . . , a|S|−1) neighbouring permutation is the permutation
(a0, a1, . . . , ay, . . . , ax, . . . , a|S|−1) for each pair x, y ∈ 〈0, |S| − 1〉 and x = y.
Each swapping of such pairs will generate a different permutation.
Four types of neighbourhood were tested:
a) all pairs – all possible pairs of swaps were tested in each iteration,
b) half of pairs – the random half of possible pairs of swaps were tested in
each iteration,
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c) elements random – all elements were tested with one randomly generated
swap in each iteration,
d) elements adjacent – all swaps of adjacent elements were tested (including
a swap of the last element with the first one) in each iteration.
3.3. Horizon
A horizon is the number of iterations in which a move is forbidden. Six types
of horizon were tested:
a) ln |R(r)|,
b) log2 |R(r)|,
c)
√|R(r)|,
d) |R(r)|/2,
e) 3|S|,
f) random from the range 〈log2 |R(r)|, 3|S|〉 (different for every iteration).
3.4. Aspiration criterion
Two types of aspiration criterion were tested:
a) none – the prohibition resulting from the tabu list is strict,
b) best so far – the move from tabu list is accepted if it produces solution of
higher value of fitness function than the best found so far.
4. Experiments and results
All experiments were conducted with the usage of an application written in
C# in Visual Studio 2015. The experiments were carried out using a computer
equipped with an Intel Core i7 processor (3.30 GHz) and 16 GB of DDR 4 RAM
and with a 64-bit operating system Windows 7 Pro installed. Presented in the
article tabu cryptanalysis (Section 3) is probabilistic algorithm and every run
can give different course. Because of that fact a test for every set of parameters
was repeated 32 times. Conclusions were drawn on the basis of an average of the
returned values from those 32 tests.
The attack is known plaintext attack. In this approach a cryptanalyst has
access to a plaintext and corresponding ciphertext. From those two in stream
ciphers one can calculate keystream. The aim of the research was to find state
of the permutation |S| of VMPCcipher, right after KSA. No initial bytes were
drawn. Revealing the initial internal state would allow to decrypt the rest of the
secret message, knowledge of the key is in this case unnecessary.
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4.1. Selection of parameters’ values for the tabu cryptanalysis
Conditions of experiments:
• cryptanalysis of: VMPC 10,
• analysis of 10 B of keystream,
• 10 different keys (Table 1),
• termination criterion: checking 3 628 800 permutations or ffit = 100%,
• random starting permutation,
• 4 types of fitness function (Subsection 3.1),
• 4 types of neighbourhood (Subsection 3.2),
• 6 types of horizon (Subsection 3.3),
• 2 types of aspiration criterion (Subsection 3.4),
• number of independent tests for one set of parameters: 32.
The size of the search space is equal 10! = 3 628 800.
VMPC 10 cipher works the same as full version of VMPC cipher, the only
difference is that the base permutation S contains 10 elements from 0 to 9. Also
all operations from Algorithm 1 are made mod 10.
Table 1. Keys used in cryptanalysis of the VMPC 10 cipher.
Key IV
0x0007050003010609 0x0502070002030309
0x0000000000000000 0x0502070002030309
0x0000000000000000 0x0505050505050505
0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x0008000000000000 0x0000000000000800
0x0909090909090909 0x0000000000000000
0x0001020304050607 0x0000000000000000
0x0003060306030609 0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000 0x0000000600000000
0x0000000000000000 0x0003060306030609
Different neighbourhoods have different sizes. In experiment with VMPC 10
we wanted to compare the same number of solutions checks, because we think
that such a comparison is fair. Comparing the same number of iterations would
not be authoritative, because a test for “all pairs” would last much longer than
for “elements random”. Because of the different sizes of neighbourhoods it is
not possible to give one universal number of iterations used. Moreover if the
maximum number of checked solutions was exhausted, the iteration was stopped
in the process.
152
Bereitgestellt von  Uniwersytet Slaski - University of Silesia - Silesian University | Heruntergeladen  15.10.19 06:03   UTC
TABU CRYPTANALYSIS OF VMPC STREAM CIPHER
The selection of the parameter values of the tabu cryptanalysis was made
according to the following scheme: the values of the determined parameter were
changed in a given range, at the set values of the other parameters. The value
of the parameter, which made it possible to obtain the best results, was each
time determined as valid at the later stage of the experiment. This scheme was
performed successively for all of the mentioned parameters. The following initial
values of parameters were assumed:
• fitness function: byte (eq. (5)),
• neighbourhood: half of pairs,
• horizon: √|R(r)|,
• aspiration criterion: none.
First tests were performed for the fitness function (Table 2). Then the neigh-
bourhood (Table 3) and the horizon (Table 4) were tested in turn. Finally, the
aspiration criterion was checked (Table 5).
Table 2. The results for the fitness function for VMPC 10 cipher.
ffit Number of successes
byte 302 94.4%
adjacent byte 287 89.7%
weighted 219 68.4%
weighted reversely 206 64.8%
The best results (94.4%) were achieved for simple byte fitness. A little worse
results (89.7%) were achieved for more complicated adjacent byte fitness. Both
weighted fitness resulted definitely worse (64.8-68.4%) (Table 2).
Table 3. The results for the neighbourhood for VMPC 10 cipher.
Neighbourhood Number of successes
all pairs 0 0.0%
half of pairs 302 94.4%
elements random 299 93.4%
elements adjacent 0 0.0%
In each iteration, swaps are randomly selected, which further reduces the
chances of falling into the cycle. Even if the same solution is analysed again, in
its neighbourhood there may not be a solution obtained by the swap that was
done previously.
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The best results (94.4%) were achieved for ”half of pairs” neighbourhood.
A slightly worse results (93.4%) were achieved for ”elements random” neigh-
bourhood. The other two types of neighbourhood resulted in 0% success rate
(Table 3).
In the case of “elements random” analysis, the exploration of the solution
space in relation to the “all pairs” neighbourhood is significantly increased (Table
3). In “all pairs” neighbourhood there is the largest neighbourhood size from
those under consideration. This resulted in the smallest number of actual swaps.
It seems that this is the reason of poor results in this case. In “elements adjacent”
neighbourhood swaps can be made only between adjacent elements. Probably
this caused the algorithm to stuck in local optimum.
Table 4. The results for the horizon for VMPC 10 cipher.
Horizon Number of successes
ln |R(r)| 302 94.4%
log2 |R(r)| 295 92.2%√|R(r)| 302 94.4%
|R(r)|/2 292 91.3%
3|S| 305 95.3%
random 297 92.8%
The results for different horizon functions are more or less similar. This shows
that the algorithm is not quite sensitive for this parameter. The best results
(95.3%) were obtained for 3|S| (for VMPC 10 horizon 3|S| = 30) (Table 4).
Table 5. The results for the aspiration criterion for VMPC 10 cipher.
Aspiration Number of successes
none 305 95.3%
best so far 299 92.2%
Better results (95.3%) were achieved without aspiration criterion (Table 5).
The reason for this is not quite obvious.
On the basis of this experiment on the VMPC 10 cipher, the following set of
parameters was chosen for further experiments:
• fitness function: byte (eq. (5)),
• neighbourhood: half of pairs,
• horizon: 3|S|,
• aspiration criterion: none.
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For these parameter values, the proper permutation was found in 305 runs from
320 (95.3%) after checking an average of 858 708 permutations, which is equiv-
alent to searching 23.7% of the entire solution space. A graph of average value
of fitness function in subsequent iterations is presented in Fig. 1. The graph
includes only tests that ended with success.
Figure 1. A graph of fitness function in subsequent iterations of tabu
cryptanalysis of VMPC 10 cipher.
4.2. Cryptanalysis of VMPC 16 cipher
Conditions of experiments:
• cryptanalysis of: VMPC 16,
• analysis of 16 B of keystream,
• 5 different keys (Table 6),
• termination criterion: checking 1 600 000 000 permutations or ffit = 100%,
• random starting permutation,
• parameters:
– byte fitness (eq. 5),
– neighbourhood: half of pairs,
– horizon: 3|S|,
– aspiration criterion: none,
• number of independent tests for one set of parameters: 32.
The size of the search space is equal 16! = 20 922 789 888 000≈ 244.
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Table 6. Keys used in cryptanalysis of the VMPC 16 cipher.
K
ey
IV
0
x
0
6
0
1
0
1
0
A
0
7
0
7
0
8
0
9
0B
0
60
C
0
10
70
D
0
6
07
0
x
0
B
0
C
0
F
0
0
0
E
0
7
0
3
0
5
0
7
0
80
20
F
0
D
0
20
10
5
0
x
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
A
0
x
0
5
0
5
0
5
0
5
0
5
0
5
0
5
0
50
5
05
05
05
0
50
50
5
05
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
0
0
x
0
8
0
F
0
6
0
D
0
4
0
B
0
2
0
9
00
0
70
F
02
05
0
80
B
0E
0
x
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
00
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
0
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
0
00
00
00
0
00
10
0
00
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Table 7. Keys used in cryptanalysis of the VMPC cipher (the one with
ID 0 is the official test vector [13]).
ID
K
ey
IV
0
0
x
9
6
6
1
4
1
0
a
b
7
9
7
d
8
a
9
eb
7
6
7c
2
11
72
d
f6
c7
0
x
4
b
5
c2
f0
0
3
e6
7
f3
9
5
5
7
a8
d
2
6f
3
d
a
2b
1
5
5
1
0
x
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
aa
a
aa
aa
a
aa
aa
aa
a
aa
aa
0
x
4
b
5
c2
f0
0
3
e6
7
f3
9
5
5
7
a8
d
2
6f
3
d
a
2b
1
5
5
2
0
x
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
aa
a
aa
aa
a
aa
aa
aa
a
aa
aa
0
x
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
55
55
55
5
55
55
5
55
55
5
3
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
0
4
0
x
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
0
5
0
x
0
9
0
9
0
9
0
9
0
9
0
9
0
90
9
09
09
0
90
90
90
9
09
09
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
0
6
0
x
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
60
7
08
09
0
a0
b
0
c0
d
0
e0
f
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
0
7
0
x
2
8
8
ff
6
5
d
c4
2
b
9
2
f9
6
0
c7
0f
62
b
5
0
85
b
a
e
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
0
8
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
0
9
0
x
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
0
00
00
0
00
00
00
0
00
00
0
x
2
8
8
ff
6
5
d
c4
2
b
9
2
f9
6
0
c7
0
f6
2
b
5
08
5b
a
e
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VMPC 16 cipher works the same as the full version of VMPC cipher, the only
difference is that the base permutation S contains 16 elements from 0 to 15. Also
all operations from Algorithm 1 are made mod 16.
Of the 160 tests carried out, 129 (80.6%) ended in finding the proper permu-
tation in a given number of verified permutations. Fig. 2 presents in the form
of a box chart the number of permutations checked before finding the proper
permutation. The graph includes only those tests that were successful, i.e. the
proper permutation was found. On average, it was necessary to check 278 033 351
permutations before finding the proper permutation. This is 0.0013% of the en-
tire solution space.
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 ·106
permutations
Figure 2. The number of permutations needed to find the correct permu-
tation of the VMPC 16 cipher.
4.3. Cryptanalysis of VMPC cipher
Conditions of experiments:
• cryptanalysis of: VMPC,
• analysis of 256 B of keystream,
• 10 different keys (Table 7),
• termination criterion: 306 iterations (with 16 320 permutations checked in
each iteration),
• random starting permutation,
• parameters:
– byte fitness (eq. 5),
– neighbourhood: half of pairs,
– horizon: 3|S|,
– aspiration criterion: none,
• number of independent tests for one set of parameters: 32.
The size of the search space is equal 256! ≈ 21684.
158
Bereitgestellt von  Uniwersytet Slaski - University of Silesia - Silesian University | Heruntergeladen  15.10.19 06:03   UTC
TABU CRYPTANALYSIS OF VMPC STREAM CIPHER
For comparison, a 5 000 000 random permutations were also generated and
evaluated using the same fitness function. This is approximately equal to the
number of permutations evaluated during one tabu cryptanalysis run.
The results are summarized in the Table 8. The value of fitness function was
9.8% on average for tabu cryptanalysis. At the same time random permutation
check gave compatibility of 0.4% at average and 3.9% at maximum.
The approximation of the fitness function was verified by regression analysis.
Four types of regression were tested: linear, logarithmic, exponential and power.
Logarithmic regression gives the smallest error value R2, so in the further analysis
the results will be presented using it. The average course of the fitness function
in subsequent iterations is shown in Fig. 3 in blue. The graph also shows the
logarithmic regression line corresponding to the presented course of the fitness
function in red. The logarithmic regression equation for this plot can be described
by the formula:
f(x) = 0.0096496251 ln(x) + 0.0447960899 (R2 = 0.903). (9)
Using extrapolation, it can be calculated from the eq. (9) that full compatibility
of the keystream will be achieved after about 2143 iterations. In each iteration,
16 320 ≈ 214 solutions are checked. So in order to find the proper permutation,
it is necessary to check about 2157 possibilities.
Figure 3. A graph of fitness function in subsequent iterations of tabu
cryptanalysis of VMPC cipher — blue dots; logarithmic regression graph
is marked in red.
The role of tabu list is to prevent falling local optimum. On the reduced
versions of the VMPC cipher, it was implicitly shown that the method works.
Assuming — with tabu list and effectiveness of Tabu Search for other big prob-
lems — the algorithm will not fall into local optimum and if the upward trend is
maintained, the regression curve will be maintained. This is valuation with high
probability.
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Table 8. Results obtained for the VMPC cipher; in the case of a tabu
cryptanalysis, for each key the value of the fitness function was given and
(below) the iteration number in which this value was obtained. For the
permutations generated randomly, for each key the obtained value of the
fitness function was given in the given number of runs.
Fitness
function byte
Algorithm tabu cryptanalysis random
Key ID min avg max s min avg max s
0 7.4% 9.5% 11.7% 1.1% 0.0% 0.4% 3.9% 0.4%
39 159 292 81 – – – –
1 6.6% 9.7% 11.7% 1.3% 0.0% 0.4% 3.5% 0.4%
21 152 285 86 – – – –
2 6.6% 9.7% 12.5% 1.4% 0.0% 0.4% 3.5% 0.4%
21 148 282 80 – – – –
3 6.6% 9.7% 12.5% 1.2% 0.0% 0.4% 3.9% 0.4%
23 156 306 84 – – – –
4 7.0% 9.8% 12.1% 1.4% 0.0% 0.4% 3.5% 0.4%
31 156 291 66 – – – –
5 7.8% 9.8% 13.7% 1.3% 0.0% 0.4% 3.5% 0.4%
24 187 305 90 – – – –
6 6.3% 9.7% 14.1% 1.9% 0.0% 0.4% 3.5% 0.4%
23 168 306 82 – – – –
7 8.2% 10.2% 12.1% 1.1% 0.0% 0.4% 3.5% 0.4%
47 174 303 87 – – – –
8 6.6% 9.4% 12.5% 1.6% 0.0% 0.4% 3.5% 0.4%
47 141 292 71 – – – –
9 5.9% 10.1% 13.3% 1.4% 0.0% 0.4% 3.5% 0.4%
25 154 306 82 – – – –
altogether 5.9% 9.8% 14.1% 1.4% 0.0% 0.4% 3.9% 0.4%
18 160 306 80 – – – –
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Although this number is beyond the perspective of practical breaking of the
cipher, it is a much better result than the best of known attacks (presented in
the Subsection 2.1) requiring on average 2260 computing operations. The rest
of the attacks presented in the Subsection 2.1 are distinguishing attacks and,
as mentioned earlier, attacks of this type neither allow direct deduction of any-
thing about the key, nor about the internal state nor about the plaintext.
5. Conclusions and future work
In the paper, tabu cryptanalysis was presented — a state recovery attack
based on Tabu Search metaheuristic. On reduced version of VMPC cipher it
was shown that this kind of attack is possible. It is also worth pointing out
that all successful tests for VMPC 10 and VMPC 16 ciphers returned the proper
permutation.
From estimates made on a full version of VMPC cipher we concluded that
about 2157 permutations needs to be checked in order to find the proper one.
This is still a big number, but it is much better than 2260 computational opera-
tions needed so far [13]. Other attacks are distinguishing ones and they cannot
directly lead to revealing the key or the plaintext. Further, research on the pro-
posed cryptanalytic attack can lead to finding real-time attack on VMPC cipher.
The same attack could be also possible for other permutation-based stream ci-
phers, e.g., RC4 [5] or S p r i t z [10].
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